Transparent Succession: The Appointment of the INEC Chairman in Nigeria

With Professor Mahmood Yakubu’s two-term tenure as Chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) concluding in November 2025, Nigeria is nearing another critical moment: the selection of his successor. Civil society organizations, notably the Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP), have urged President Bola Tinubu to open up the process to public scrutiny and ensure the appointment is grounded in constitutional norms, fairness, and institutional legitimacy.

Below is an account of (1) the constitutional and statutory framework for appointing the INEC Chair, (2) historical precedents and controversies, (3) issues raised by SERAP and others, and (4) recommendations for a credible process.

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1. Legal and Constitutional Framework

Establishment and Composition of INEC

• The 1999 Constitution (as amended) establishes INEC under Section 153 of the Constitution.
• The Third Schedule (Part I, Paragraph 14) prescribes that INEC shall consist of one Chairman (Chief Electoral Commissioner) and twelve National Electoral Commissioners, each drawn from different geopolitical zones.

Appointment of Chairman and Commissioners

• Under Section 154(1) of the Constitution, all non-ex officio “Chairman and members” of bodies (including INEC) are to be appointed by the President, and such appointments are subject to confirmation by the Senate.
• However, Section 154(3) adds an important caveat: when appointing (or reappointing) the INEC Chairman (or members of certain other commissions), the President shall consult the Council of State.

Thus, the constitutional prescription is threefold:

1. Nomination by the President
2. Consultation with the Council of State
3. Confirmation by the Senate

These steps are meant to introduce checks and promote legitimacy in selecting someone to head Nigeria’s apex electoral body.

Tenure, Removal, and Independence

• Commissioners (including the Chairman) hold office for five years (subject to renewal) per Section 155(1)(c), unless other constitutional reasons arise.
• Removal before the expiration of the tenure is not at the President’s pleasure: per Section 157, a Commissioner (or Chairman) may be removed only by the President on address of the Senate (two-thirds majority) and for specified causes (infirmity, misconduct, or inability to perform functions).
• The Constitution further protects INEC’s operational autonomy: in exercising appointment or disciplinary powers, INEC “shall not be subject to the direction or control of any authority or person.”

These constraints are vital guardrails intended to insulate INEC from undue executive interference.

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2. Past Practice and Key Precedents

To contextualize how the appointment process unfolded historically—and where the risks lie—it is useful to survey notable past cases.

Example: Yakubu’s Reappointment

• In October 2020, President Muhammadu Buhari formally nominated Professor Mahmood Yakubu for a second five-year term, transmitting a letter to the Senate for confirmation in line with Section 154(1).
• Critics pointed out that it was unclear whether the President had properly consulted the Council of State as required under Section 154(3), and whether such consultation was documented or public.
• Some commentaries have characterized the reappointment as falling short of full transparency, especially regarding public disclosure of selection criteria, candidate shortlists, or deliberations.

Example: Amina Zakari as Acting Chairman (2015)

• In July 2015, as Yakubu’s predecessor (Attahiru Jega) left office, President Buhari named Amina Zakari (a then-National Commissioner) as Acting Chairman of INEC.
• This move was controversial, as the Constitution does not explicitly provide for “acting” appointment of the INEC Chairman.
• Critics argued the appointment circumvented constitutional safeguards, especially the requirement of Senate confirmation and consultation with the Council of State.
• Legal commentary has often cited this as an example of executive overreach, or at least a lacuna in how to handle succession when the substantive chair’s term ends before a replacement is confirmed.

Role of the Council of State

• During Attahiru Jega’s appointment in 2010, President Goodluck Jonathan convened a meeting of the National Council of States, and the nominee (Jega) was approved in that forum.
• That precedent is often cited as a best practice: using a broader consultative body of elders, former heads of state, governors, and ex-officio Council of State members as part of the vetting mechanism.

Civil Society Input on RECs

• Over the years, civil society groups have raised objections to the nomination of Resident Electoral Commissioners (RECs) seen as partisan or affiliated with ruling parties.
• In 2022, when President Buhari nominated RECs, CSOs publicly rejected some nominees over concerns about partisanship.
• This underscores that not just the Chair’s appointment but the broader composition and nonpartisanship of INEC’s leadership are ongoing issues.

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3. SERAP’s Call and Key Issues in 2025

Given this background, SERAP’s 2025 appeal to President Tinubu seeks to anchor the appointment in transparency, accountability, and inclusiveness. Below are the main points SERAP (and aligned civil society voices) have raised, and their significance.

What SERAP Is Asking

In its letter dated September 27, 2025 (signed by Kolawole Oluwadare), SERAP is demanding that the presidency:

1. Disclose the number and identities of persons under consideration for the INEC Chair position.
2. Clarify whether and how the Council of State will be or has been consulted, consistent with the constitutional requirement.
3. Use this transition as an opportunity to review recent appointments of RECs, particularly where some are alleged to be party affiliates, and replace them with non-party members.
4. Treat the selection process not as a closed shop, but one open to accountability and public trust.

SERAP sets a seven-day timeframe for compliance or risk legal action in the public interest.

Why These Issues Matter

• Legitimacy and public trust: A secretive or opaque process risks fueling suspicion that the new chair is partisan or beholden, undermining the credibility of future elections.
• Constitutional fidelity: The requirement to consult the Council of State is not optional; when practices in the past did not clearly show consultation, critics flagged constitutional gaps.
• Institutional independence: Ensuring that RECs and Commissioners are free from overt party bias is as important as the Chair’s impartiality.
• Setting precedent: The 2025 appointment will shape norms for the 2027 general election cycle. If the process is seen as credible, it could set a higher standard; if not, it may worsen doubts in electoral integrity.

Critics have already begun to raise red flags: for instance, a March 2025 Vanguard report claimed there is a plot to appoint a “yes-man” to compromise the 2027 election.

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4. Proposed Best Practices & Recommendations for a Credible Process

Drawing from constitutional prescriptions, past precedents, and civil society norms, the following steps can strengthen legitimacy and public confidence in the 2025 INEC Chair appointment.

1. Pre-announcement and call for applications

   • The presidency (or a designated independent committee) should issue a public call inviting qualified candidates, with clear criteria (age, integrity, nonpartisanship, experience).
   • Publish the shortlist (e.g., 3–5 names) and circulate through media and civil society channels.

2. Council of State Consultation

   • Convene a special session of the Council of State (or include the matter in its next meeting) and record its deliberation or endorsement.
   • Publish minutes or a communique reflecting the consultation, without compromising confidentiality of individual votes if applicable.

3. Vetting and background checks

   • Use a transparent vetting panel (possibly drawn from judicial, academic, civil society) to assess candidates’ credentials, probity, and absence of overt party alignment.
   • Publish summary findings (not necessarily full reports) to justify nominations.

4. Presidential nomination with public rationale

   • The President should transmit the selected nominee(s) to the Senate along with an explanatory memorandum, documenting the consultation, the selection process and merit basis.

5. Senate confirmation in open hearings

   • The Senate should invite public input, hold public confirmation hearings where civil society, stakeholders, or the public may observe or submit briefs.

6. Timing and transition plan

   • Provide for interim leadership (e.g. longest-serving Commissioner) if the outgoing chair’s term ends before confirmation.
   • Ensure the transition does not leave INEC leaderless during periods of election planning.

7. Appointment of nonpartisan RECs

   • As SERAP suggests, vet and revise the roster of Resident Electoral Commissioners to ensure they are not active or recent party operatives.
   • Make their appointment process similarly transparent and with appropriate checks.

8. Ongoing oversight and accountability

   • After appointment, publish the performance benchmarks or expected deliverables for the INEC Chair over the five-year term.
   • Enable periodic (e.g. annual) public reports and stakeholder engagement on INEC’s performance.

If these steps are followed, the 2025 appointment could serve as a benchmark for integrity, reinforcing public confidence in Nigeria’s electoral institutions.

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Conclusion

The appointment of a new INEC Chairman in late 2025 presents both a constitutional duty and a democratic test. The Constitution mandates that the President conduct the selection in consultation with the Council of State and submit the nominee to the Senate for confirmation. Yet past practices have sometimes lacked visible transparency or accountability.

SERAP’s call for public disclosure is not merely a symbolic demand it addresses the very foundations of legitimacy, institutional integrity, and citizen trust. If President Tinubu heeds these demands and safeguards a credible, well-documented process, Nigeria can strengthen its electoral institutions ahead of future elections. Conversely, opacity or shortcuts may corrode confidence in the very body tasked with stewarding the people’s will.